

METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM OF PAUL FEYERABEND: A Challenge for the Administration

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ABSTRACT

This theoretical paper aims to problematize the dominance of positivist approaches and their attachment to the quantification analysis and interpretation of phenomena of administration area and show that the Administration area in its fragmentation, diversity and complexity, demands new theoretical challenges to the achievement of a more pluralistic understanding of theoretical and methodological aspects of the practice of research in this area. The test aims to discuss the epistemological foundations of methodological pluralism of the Austrian philosopher of science Paul Karl Feyerabend, who despite having been referenced by the authors of an expression of Gareth Morgan remains unknown or properly "ignored" by the academy in the administration area.

Keywords: *Paul Feyerabend, Epistemological anarchism, Methodological pluralism*

INTRODUCTION

Doubtless in Administration there is still a theoretical posture domain predominantly instrumentalist in researching, that has as the main objective the forecasting, relevant aspect on hard science's researches, applying quantitative methodological procedures. In Brazil, specifically, the domain of functionalist and neo functionalist approaches, which lay on the positivist and neo positivist ground, are still predominant in relation to the critical approaches of reality. (VERGARA, 2000)

Bryman, on the beginning of the 90's, had already pointed that "the so-called scientific focus, strictly based on the parameters of the quantitative methodology, continues to be the predominant *ethos* prevalent of researching on the OS field (Organizational Studies)" (BRYMAN, 1992, p. 32).

Benson, who brings the discussion of the dialectic analysis as a methodological alternative for the Administration, attested, in the past 70's, that the majority of the studies made in Administration uses dominant, rational and positivist perspectives (BENSON, 1977). With all the reservation that can be done nowadays, still command in the area of Administration a certain type of yearning for the success of the Physics evolution and other areas of the hard science, omitting the aspect that, pleasing or not, the Administration area and all the problematic of the Organizational Theories are contextualized in the Social Science ambit.

On this line of thought, Ludwig Heirich Edler Von Mises, economist and philosopher, questions this attempt to understand the social phenomenon with the natural science's barnacle, stating that:

In the world of the physical and chemical phenomenon there are constant relations between the various components, being the man able to perceive, with a lot of precision, constant laws through suitable laboratory experiments. But, on the human action field, there are no registers of these constant reactions. The impossibility on this Field, of all the mediation will not be attributed to an alleged imperfection of the investigation methods. It comes from the changing, the conscience of the constant relations in the subject analyzed. (VON MISES, 1986, p. 97-98).

In the 80's, Katz and Kahn have already been building critics regarding the positivist dimension of the social phenomenon's explanation. Both of them state, firmly, that "there is no more universal, persistent, futile and harmful fallacy to the social science than the use of the physical model for the comprehension of the social structures" (KATZ; KAHN, 1987, p. 47).

This instrumentalist vision of the methodological process brings serious bounds for the analysis and interpretation of the complex, volatile and mutant phenomena, which cannot be quantified nor "confined" in models and fixed rules of surpassed methodological analysis, for the dimension and complexity they present, as well as the historical context they are inserted.

Even though it is not the objective of this paper to enter into a discussion about the dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative methods, it is understood that this dichotomization is false, because the methodological procedures must always be "quali-quantum". And to comprehend the complex systems, overly chaotic in their evolution, such as the organizational and social systems, it is necessary to search for theoretical and methodological approaches that go beyond the simple geographisation and mathematization of the objects. It is the chaosology theorist, Ruelle, who alerts us that, even it is possible to know good equations of temporal evolution or very precise long temporal series of organizational phenomena, to make a competent quantitative analysis, these equations slowly change throughout the time, because the system "learns" and changes its nature. (RUELLE, 1993).

A system that changes cannot be plastered on a mathematical equation; this is the meaning of Ruelle's phrase. And if we understand that on organizational studies everything changes, we need to be more exegetes and interpretive.

In this sense, the proposal of this theoretic paper is to reflect about the approach of the methodological pluralism of Paul Feyerabend, a science philosopher that still remains unknown, or even ignored, on the academic's discussions of the Administration and Organizational Studies' areas.

Paul Karl Feyerabend (1924-1994), philosopher and science historian, was born in Vienna, Austria, performed academic activities in different universities and Educational Institutions, such as: Bristol, Berkeley, Auckland, Sussex, Yale, London, Zurich and Berlin. He distinguished himself as a critic of the epistemological tendencies of the positivist empiricism and for the critic of the existence of the universal methodological rules.

The present essay means a more reflexive and critic recapture of the reference and appropriation that Gareth Morgan does on the work that he coordinated and also participated: "Beyond Method", in which points Feyerabend's contribution for the Administration area. It is interesting to point that, despite Morgan's critical position about the researching practice in Administration, he inserts Feyerabend's polemic concept "anything goes", without any analytical reflection, as one of the fundamental elements on the researching strategy that he purposes for Administration. Morgan's text points, therefore, the weight that Feyerabend already exerted in Science Philosophy ambit, in the early 80's, only five years after the publication of his classic and polemic book: "Against the Method", in 1975. It is being considered, in this text, the evolution of Feyerabend's thought from this work on.

This essay consists, therefore, of a critical reflection about the epistemological and methodological aspects of a science view or a researching practice view, present on the social sciences in general and in Administration and Organizational Studies area, in "confront" with aspects of Feyerabend's methodological pluralism.

For the development of this theoretical-critic analysis, it was chosen the hermeneutics vision of the author in focus himself, that understands the methodological sphere not as a holy field, of definite and unquestionable truths, but as a field of flexible rules and broad and plural principles which allow the creativity, audacity and provisional knowledge. So, it is aimed the development and interpretation of the analysis through multiple and plural procedures that can handle the speeches' interpretation in its denotative and connotative aspects. These procedures allow proximity of what Feyerabend puts as a big challenge for the scientific activity: "to turn strong the weak argument". And for that to be possible there is no other way than argumentation.

In "Beyond Method", Morgan purposes five different approaches, by which means becomes possible to answer to the challenge of dealing with the diversity of assumption competitors: supremacy – turned to assumptions evaluation; synthesis – turned to the search of common elements; contingency – turned to the adoption of utility criteria; dialectic – turned to the contraposition of different perspectives insights and, as the fifth approach, he points the central idea of Feyerabend's thought that "**anything goes**", referring to the science's theoretical and methodological anarchism.(MORGAN, 1983).

In his book "Against the Method", published in English in 1975, translated to Portuguese in 1977, reedited with significant changes in 1993 and translated to Portuguese in 2003, the 19th chapter and part of the 16th chapter have been rewritten, the old 20th was omitted and some paragraphs were added in the whole work. These changes and additions just show the evolution of Feyerabend's thought, without leaving out the essential points of his epistemology, which presents thesis against all the philosophical tradition, notably the empirical, intuitivist and positivist of the scientific knowledge, and purposes an epistemological anarchism with a more accepted position to the sciences, which expresses itself through a methodological pluralism.

Even though he had explained and relativized the sense of his epistemological anarchism, Feyerabend provoked several controversies on the academic sectors and among the science philosophers in general. It is not suitable in this essay to recover the main topics, aspects of the discussion, polemics and confrontation between Feyerabend's

and his objectors' ideas. However, the essay points the confront of their ideas and, mainly, their vision of science and problematization of the scientific method, under the positive science's point of view and its different sides on the functionalist, systemic and quantitative forms, in general. These analysis standards are still a lot present in academic works of general social science and, more specifically, in Administration and Organizational Studies ambit.

ANYTHING GOES AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANARCHISM

Before presenting the fundamentals of his methodological proposal, Feyerabend builds serious critics to the empiricist vision of science, which methodological rules are no longer an instrument of knowledge and became an obstacle to the knowledge advance, underlining that the main developments of the scientific thought's history made themselves in absentia of the established rules and that there is, between them and the scientists' practice an impassable abyss. The Szent-Györgyi behavior, praised with the Nobel Prize of Medicine and Physiology in 1937 for the discovery of the Vitamin C, illustrates this dichotomy between the procedure established and legitimated by the academy and the researcher's behavior. After confessing his agony in elaborating projects according to the established rules, Szent-Györgyi states:

Researching means to go and look for the unknown hoping to find something new to bring home. If you know before what you are going to do or even what you are going to find there, so this is not research, it is just a kind of honored occupation (SZENT-GYÖRGYI, 1971, p. 1).

On this same line of thought, Feyerabend purposes on the first chapter of "Against the Method", the master line of his argument, developed through all his work. This way he clearly summarizes his questioning about the clarity of the scientific method:

It is clear, then, that the Idea of a fixed method or of a fixed rationality's theory is based on a very naive conception of the man and his social circumstances. For those who exam the rich material provided by history and do not have the intention of make it poor to please their low instincts, their yearning for intellectual safety in form of clearness, precision, "objectivity" and "truth", will be clear that there is only one principle that can be defended in all the circumstances and in all the stages of the human development. It is the principle of *anything goes* (FEYERABEND, 2007, p. 43, author's emphasis)

The feyerabedian "anything goes" makes impossible the establishment of any methodological canon, or idea of a fix method, or of a fix theory of rationality and does not make any distinction between the different forms of knowledge, between what is science and what is not science, establishing, this way, a situation that he accepts as the **epistemological anarchism**.

Although Feyerabend had explained, in different moments, about the sense of his anarchism, during the last decades until nowadays, different authors question, sometimes partially, sometimes radically and with certain vehemence, the feyerabendian anarchist posture (BRICMONT, SOKAL, 1999; BUNGE, 1995; MEYNELL, 1978; OLIVA, 2005). Great part of the critic, however, has not been giving the credit to what he really meant to say. In "Against the Method", Feyerabend relates how his anarchism idea was born in a conversation with his friend, saying that: "Imere Lakatos, kidding, called me anarchist, and I did not have objections to wear the anarchist cover" (FEYERABEND, 2007, p. 31). Therefore, it was never his initiative such denomination.

On the introduction of "Against the Method", Feyerabend (2007, p.31) tries to clarify the sense of his anarchism stating that "theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and able to stimulate the progress than its alternatives that defend law and order". Confesses that the anarchism is not the most attractive political philosophy, for its sectarianism, but it is an excellent remedy for the epistemology. Feyerabend appeals for the Dadaism idea (artistic Movement of the so-called modern vanguard initiated in Zurich in 1915), that did not have only a program, but also was against all the programs and ends his footnote stating that the reader should remember him as a irreverent Dadaist and not as a serious anarchist. In the end of the second chapter of "Against the Method", Feyerabend summarizes creatively and with a certain dose of humor his anarchist posture: "An anarchist is like a secret agent that takes place in the reason game so that he can erode reason's authority (Truth, Honesty, Justice, and so on)" (FEYERABEND, 2007, p. 49).

These Feyerabend's statements, mainly expressed in his original work "Against the Method", doubtless produced and still produce big misunderstandings and these ones are largely broad by rushed interpretations of the *subtitle* of the original edition: "sketch of an anarchist theory of knowledge", by the way, excluding from the second reviewed edition, and aggravated by the idea that it became a word of order: "**anything goes**".

The adoption of this principle would translate the supposed conviction that, for Feyerabend, the scientific research would be a completely anarchist achievement, disproved of any rules. However, this is not the intentionality of what Feyerabend expresses in his work and, mainly, in the revision of “Against the Method” and his posterior production (FEYERABEND, 1991, 2006, 2011).

The leading line of “Against the Method” is that:

The Idea of a method that contains fix, immutable and absolutely mandatory principles to conduct the science businesses, faces a considerable difficulty when confronted with the results of the historical research. We find out, then, that there is no such an only rule, yet plausible and solidly grounded on the epistemology that is violated at any moment (FEYERABEND, 2011, p. 38).

This idea is expressed in the most radical way when says, repeating the old master Karl Popper, that “There is no ‘scientific method’, there is no unique procedure or set of rules that is subjacent to every step of investigation and guarantees that it is ‘scientific’, and, therefore, trustable” (FEYERABEND, 2011, p. 122).

As consequences of these critics, Feyerabend purposes the “anything goes” not as a cult to the unreason and to the total absence of criteria in the scientific work, as many of his critics have interpreted.

That is why Feyerabend, answering to his critics, states, categorically that:

The “anything goes” does not express any conviction of mine, it is a jocose summary of the rationalist predicament: if you want universal standards, I say, if you cannot live without principles that maintain themselves independent of the situation, of the world’s form, of the research’s exigencies, of the temperamental peculiarities, I can give you a principle like this. It will be empty, useless and pretty ridiculous – but will be a “principle”. It will be the “principle” that “anything goes” (FEYERABEND, 2011, p. 236).

That, therefore, what Feyerabend treats as a jocose slogan, became, for a lot of his critics, a “central thesis” of his work. And like this, do BUNGE, 1995; OLIVA 1998 and in a certain way SOKAL AND BRICMONT, 1999.

In the new edition of “Against the method”, in which Feyerabend combines with the docks of “The science in a free society” restates that:

[...] “anything goes” is not a “principle” that I support – I do not think that “principles” can be profitably used and discussed out of the concrete research situation that supposedly affect - , but it is the frightened exclamation of a rationalist that closer examines the history (FEYERABEND, 2007, p. 8).

It is worth to detach that Feyerabend’s preoccupation with the inefficiency of the methodological presupposition does not mean that he is interested in replace a set of rules for others of the same specie; unlike, his proposal is to convince his readers that all the methodologies, even the most obvious, have their limits. By the way, Feyerabend is not even concerned in building a theory of the science with a hefty *corpus* and with permanent fundamentals. For him, all the enthusiasm in this direction is inglorious or in vain, because it contradicts the principle that: regarding the nature our possibilities are multiple and equally multiple is also the reality we contemplate on it (FEYERABEND, 1991). His exegesis, therefore, is much more a deconstruction of the legitimate speech with the suggestion of “clues” to the search of new pathways, where the science is a science of human and social freedom and not a closed and finished theorization about the science.

Discovery’s context and justification’s context

This theme has fundamental importance in Feyerabend’s thought that does not accept the distinction of these two concepts.

Hans Reichenbach, neo positivist of the Vienna Circle, was who first established an epistemologically relevant distinction for the logic-empiricist conception of the science, distinguishing the discovery and justification concepts when stated: “I will introduce the terms of discovery context and justification context to make this distinction. Therefore, we have to say that epistemology is only engaged in building the Justification Context” (REICHENBACH, 1938, p. 6-7).

Yes, it was the epistemological posture that dominated the entire 20th century, and is still present in the 21st century, and had, on the positivist, neo positivist and empirical approaches of Hempel, Popper and Reichenbach, for instance, its main representatives. In this nectar, many Administration theorists feed themselves. They believe,

almost as a faith element, that the justification speech is the way to make the scientific. The “justified” science is the big criteria of the scientific truth production. But this science, according to Kuhn and Feyerabend, is a disembodied, uncluttered, without history, without multiplicity and plurality science. Ultimately, it consists only in one mere quantified or a geographised form. Kuhn, who has great affinities with Feyerabend and that does not make distinctions between the two contexts and with all the theoretical changes made throughout his trajectory, showed precisely, in the last phrase of his classical book, that: “The scientific knowledge, as the language, is intrinsically the common property of a group or it is nothing at all. To understand it, we need to know the essential characteristics of the groups that created and use it.” (KUHN, 1991, p. 257). Moral of the story: without knowing the context of the discovery, we do not understand what scientific knowledge is and the justification context loses its importance. Here is suitable a question: who are the authors or groups that produce and legitimate the knowledge of the area? This question, doubtless, would be material for another essay.

Back to the discovery’s and justification’s context, it is amazing the weigh that Hempel gives to the observation, which also established distinction between the two contexts, stating that the validity of a hypothesis can only be measured by the justification context, because what determines the solidity of a hypothesis is not the way how you got to it, admitting even that it could raise from a dream or from an hallucination, but the way how it keeps when confronted with relevant data related to the observation. (HEMPEL, 1965). So, would it be, by chance, the Discovery context a field of “dream” or “hallucination”? Certainly, this reductionism castrates significantly all the relevant dimensions of the discovery context in the process of scientific knowledge building like so well showed Kuhn in his work and that Feyerabend insisted in almost all his texts: that the science does not moves forward by the fidelity of its canons’ realizations (justification context), but by the epistemological transgression of the researchers (discovery context).

It is not about dichotomizing the two instances, but recognizing the role of each one in a conjunction dimension. Because of this, Feyerabend states that: “The discovery, on one hand, can be irrational and does not need to follow any recognized method. The justification, on the other hand, only starts after the discoveries are made and go along in an organized manner” (FEYERABEND, 2007, p. 207).

Once understood, the scientific practice is not the union of two distinct contexts “moving beside each other”, but a complex and complicated mix of procedures, which ingredients are all important to the advance of science.

PLURALIST METHODOLOGY

As we previously saw, Feyerabend rejects the methodological clarity proposed by the empirical positivism that preaches the method unit and the theoretical unit. As well as, by the neo positivist postures, mainly in the Vienna circle, that had an anti-metaphysical posture and believed in the “neutrality” of the science that could be reached by the logical-mathematic.

As Silva states when analyses the theoretical posture of Feyerabend: “ Instead of the theoretical monism that demands each moment to be used only one unique set of theories mutually consistent; that restrains the liberty of theoretical invention, eliminating new hypothesis for not to satisfy some formal requires” (SILVA, 1998, p. 232), Feyerabend purposes a methodological pluralism, stating that: “A scientist that wishes to maximize the empirical content of the conceptions that support and understand them as clearly as possible should, therefore, introduce other conceptions, in other words, needs to adopt a **pluralist** methodology” (FEYERABEND, 2007, p. 46, highlights from the authors

The pluralist vision of Feyerabend is, doubtless, a very broad proposal about the knowledge construction. In his pluralism there is no place for “dictatorship” of theories and the method “monopoly”. It is necessary to prove theories and ideas with other theories and ideas more than with the experience, data or facts. Not even those conceptions that have failed, or that, somehow, were rejected must be discarded, because these will help with the knowledge growth’s process and with the creation of a progress model for the science, alternative to the progress model of the accumulation (FEYERABEND, 2007).

This feyerabendian theoretical amplitude, doubtless, questions the dominant postures on the nature sciences and on the social sciences, that search for and legitimate a vision of scientific knowledge as a justified sum of theories and auto-consistent ideas that converge to an ideal or idealized conception of the reality and states that the knowledge:

[...] it is, before, an always crescent ocean of alternatives mutually incompatible, in which each theory, each fairy tale and each myth that is part of the collection forces the others to a bigger articulation, all of them contributing, upon this competition process, to the development of our conscience (FEYERABEND, 2007, p. 46).

This pluralist methodology vision, that searches its grounding on the proliferation of theoretical alternatives mutually inconsistent and detaches an exemplar role to the metaphysical ideas in the progress of the scientific knowledge, opposing, them, to the neo positivists of the Vienna circle. According to the position expressed in this circle's manifest, it was necessary to bury the grammar's metaphysic of the science. However, they accept the presence of the metaphysic only in the discovery context, sphere that allows the contribution of rational and irrational elements, because it is separated from the justification context in which there is no space for the "irrational" metaphysical contributions.

However, for Feyerabend, this vision reduces the metaphysical thought to a mere psychological role of theoretical invention stimulant and puts it pair-to-pair with any other irrational element. On the other hand, on a pluralist methodology vision, according to the author, the metaphysical ideas have a specific role to play, allowing creating what seems to be highly confirmed by the scientific theory.

In "Against the Method", Feyerabend detaches that the pluralism of the theories and metaphysical conceptions are not important only for the methodology; are also essential part of a humanitarian vision.

Summarizing, Feyerabend's methodological pluralist allows to enrich the analysis of the Administration's phenomena, that shall not be limited to the metering and quantification models, aligned to positivist and empiric approaches, understanding that such phenomena are dynamic, in constant mutation process, suffering even multiple influences of the environment, of the context in which they are inserted and the actions of the subjects and the society. These multidimensionality of the phenomena cannot be analyzed by ready and ended methods, not even through an unique fix theoretical presuppositions, because, according to Ziman (1980, p. 19), mentioned by Feyerabend in his book "The conquer of the abundance", "there is not an unique scientific map of reality – or if there was it would be very complicated, impossible to be understood or used by someone. But there are many different maps of the reality, from a variety of scientific points of view" (apud FEYERABEND, 2006, p. 208). Consequently, the approach of a methodological pluralism would allow the fecundity of the analysis and interpretation.

The option for a methodological pluralism commands us to overcome the limits of the quantification and metering that will not be able to handle the reality in its totality and complexity. Einstein thought it was strange the monopoly tendency of the metering asking: Is not it really strange "...that the human beings are deaf to the stronger arguments while they are always bend to overvalue the metering precisions?" (FEYERABEND, 2005, p. 307).

Almost like completing Einstein's argument, Feyerabend said that, in the scientific activity, the big challenge "[...] it is not to search for the truth or to systematize observation or to improve the predictions. These are only collateral effects of an activity for which your attention directly turns to and that is turning stronger the weak argument [...]" (FEYERABEND, 1989, p. 41). Doubtless, these statements suggest that it is not worth the domain of a set of rules and precepts if the "argument is weak". There comes the importance of a fecund repertory on the development of a methodological strategy in the knowledge production with the objective of searching the "strong argument".

It is suitable now to point the interpretation given by Morgan to the importance of the Feyerabend's thought for the Administration, saying that:

The theoretical and methodological anarchism in the science based on the fact that there is no idea, even old or absurd, that is not able to improve our knowledge. Approaches of researches that are complementary, contradictory, or that act counter-intuitively defying the formal logic are all acceptable, because can generate some form of perception and comprehension that cannot be reached by any other means. The Feyerabend's Anarchism is engaged in a creative humanism that recognizes the potential contradiction between creativity and method, rejecting the idea that a form of knowledge can be determined exclusively as superior to the other. To Feyerabend, only the human subject, being a researcher, the thing being researched or knowledge user, is in conditions to choose the type of knowledge or ideology that should guide our activities (MORGAN, 1983, p. 380, author's translation).

Feyerabend's Contributions to the Administration

The main Feyerabend's contribution to the Administration and to the scientific knowledge was the proposal of a methodological pluralism, creating, this way, overpasses with different forms of knowledge.

On the Feyerabend's epistemological vision it is expressed the idea that a science that cannot provide eternal and definitive answers, but, in opposition to that, is in a constant process of development and changes. To Feyerabend, the paradigms are only overpast – and the science, consequently, makes advances – when the traditionally accepted academic methods are questioned and transgressed.

Feyerabend, with his vision that the science moves forward through the transgression and using a plurality of theories and methods, brings for the Administration area a critical questioning to the rigid models of management and to what became conventional to call Administration's phenomena's neutralization as concrete entities. Reflection, this, that takes us to an abstraction of Administration's phenomena's origins and of the historical context in which they are in and of the relations of power and even of the political and economic structures.

It is really strange and even and absurd for an area like the Administration, that looks for its affirmation in the context and scientific community, that suffers from theoretical and methodological jumps that can handle the challenges of the phenomena and happenings that evolve the organizational world and the Administration activities, in contexts more and more complex and uncertain, that still remains, in a broad form, tied to a reductionist, simplifier and always referred according to the dictation of the rules of the Physical and Natural Sciences, vision of science. It always seems to rise on the produced texts a recurrent missing of the physics, sometimes in a superficial and simplifier way, not knowing or ignoring that the Administration area is essential and fundamentally one of the areas of the social sciences.

Recognizing the presupposition above, that the Administration area is located in the ambit of the Social Sciences, this means looking for methodological procedures that can handle the diversity, complexity and transitoriness of the Administration phenomena. Morgan in his text in "Beyond Method", that looks like the Feyerabend's "anything goes", establishes as a research object in organizational studies dialogs and conversations as methodological strategies to reach the social interaction and to comprehend the organizational strategies as a field of different voices and senses (MORGAN, 1983).

Morgan's proposal, doubtless, means a transgression to the normative dictations that domain the Administration area. He gets close to Feyerabend when he states that the objective of science is not to produce definitive and exact truths, but to present strong arguments about provisory truths.

In the past 50's of the last century the North-American sociologist C. Wright Mills, upon the fragility of the theoretical and methodological contributions to the social studies grounded and inspired on the Parsonian functionalism, pointed precepts of a new methodological strategy for the researchers of social phenomena. Among these precepts, we detach the first in a summarized way, by the level of importance it has: "May we be a good craftsman: may we avoid each and every rigid procedure rule. Above all, may we look forward to develop and deny sociologic not appropriation. May we avoid the fetishism of method and technique" (MILLS, 1969, p. 240).

Feyerabend with a stimulant and provocative report becomes strong for the science, in general Mills' argument turned to the enrichment of the social science when he states that the science's methods have failed attempting to provide precise rules to guide the scientists in their scientific works.

Consequently, he infers in a categorical manner and with strong argumentation based on the historical evolution of the scientific knowledge that there is not a method able to explain, justify and ground the Physics evolution and its superiority about the different forms of knowledge. To Feyerabend, the methods applied in the sciences (physical and natural) change with the time and circumstances. And in these areas, the change occurs, much more in the social sciences that deal with transitory phenomena and with human, social and historical constructs.

On the pertinent reading, Silva, in his Mastership Thesis about Feyerabend, mentions the argument that Feyerabend presents about the fragility of a methodological scope for the production of a scientific truth:

[...] although is possible to analyze them posteriorly, in the attempt of rebuild the reasons of the procedures adopted on past episodes, it is not possible to assure at the moment the success nor the fitness of any methodological rule, nor classify as scientific (or not scientific) a theory or a procedure based on the conformity (or no conformity) to an immutable and universal given method. (SILVA, 1998, p. 325).

To rescue this feyerabendian vision it means to put in check the trend that dominates the studies of Administration and Organizational Studies that let them be seduced by the "Physics missing" and by the quantitative forms of interpret complex, transitory and liquid phenomena in Zygunt Bauman's sayings about the new modernity

nowadays and to look for new theoretical and methodological standards in a flexible and creative way of different theoretical and methodological trends of nowadays.

We live in a world that let be seduced by quantitativism. Nowadays we are under the empire of the “It is scientific what can be measured” (MARTIN, 2011). We award with glory the works that privilege this approach. We make the geographisation of the objects and think that, this way, we are painting the reality. A reality without intentions, motivations, subjectivity and historicity.

Here it is not about ignoring the importance of the quantification, but to point its limits, recognizing that the quantitativism decontextualizes the human behavior, taking out the event of its place in the real world and ignoring the effect of the variables not included in the model.

We would say, yet, that Feyerabend brings a contribution to the Administration area when he states that no set of methodological rules stays invariable upon the diversity of the concrete contexts of the Administration and organizations spheres and upon the changes of the historical conditions, which inside they are located. The science, says Feyerabend, walks with a lot of approaches and theories, using everything and not the rigorous obedience of specific approaches that fit in rigid administration and management modeling.

In the end, Feyerabend alerts us to the acceptability of a rationality that does not take us to servitude, but to the growth of our humanity and our abilities for the questioning of the dominant rationalities and its standards of analysis and interpretation, having in mind the construction of a free and democratic society.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Feyerabend emphasizes the importance of other forms of knowledge to understand the reality, such as the religion, the myth, the art (wrote about the science as art: *Wissenschaft als Kunst*, 1984) and many others that do not have to submit to limiter rules of what we call science or scientific knowledge. He creates important overpasses between the different forms of knowledge to understand the human and social reality. This pluralist posture has in the Polish contemporary humanist sociologist, Bauman, a significant example. In an interview given to *Folha de São Paulo*, he said:

I, for example, I remember to learn from Tolstoy, Balzac, Dickens, Dostoyevsky, Kafka or Thomas Morus much more insights about the substance of the human experience than from hundreds of sociological researches' reports. Above all, I learnt not to ask where a determined Idea comes from, but only how it helps to illuminate human responses to its condition, subject from the sociology and from the “*belle lettres*” (BAUMAN, 2007).

At the same time he states his theoretical pluralism, Feyerabend recognizes that the scientific knowledge expresses itself through methodological rules, that must be flexibly indeterminately formulated and that allow us to understand the complex realities, because what we call objective reality is nothing but a human elaboration, constructed from several observations and discontinued glances.

Feyerabend's methodological pluralism's dialog with the Administration universe will become fertile in the actual economic crisis that generally affects the world, producing economic-financial, ecologic and ethic challenges, as it is understood the need of thinking about new organizational models, new productivity dimensions and a human manner of understanding the efficiency and efficacy on business. Consequently, the search of these ideas demands new methodological and epistemological postures that can handle the challenges of the complexities of the world we live in and project the human being to a fairer socio-ecological condition.

It is worth to detach, yet, Feyerabend's humanism when he says that: “Love becomes impossible for people who insist in the objectivity, in other words, that live entirely according to the spirit of science” (apud SOKAL; BRICMONT, 1999, p. 90). In a democratic and free society the scientist cannot bend on his knees to the Goddess Reason and hide behind a presumed objectivity and fix rules that guarantee that his thoughts are true.

Through the years, there were a certain number of changes on the theoretical presuppositions of Feyerabend, as much as epistemological position and emphasis. But, his acid critic to a positivist form of empiricism remains constant in his posterior works “*Against the Methods*”.

However, this critical acidity turns now to his critics, who he accuses with certain vehemence for the inability of argumentation and for the total lack of humor of these “public employees of the thought”. Making a mockery of himself, he states that he takes more himself for granted than his critics.

On the third part of his book “Science in a Free Society”, denominated “conversations with an ignorant”, he becomes bitter with the professor Joseph Agassi saying that his book “Against the Method” “[...] disturbs his ideas and makes his perceptions so confuse that dreams and hallucinations replace the reality in front of him” (FEYERABEND, 2011, p. 156). With the philosopher Ernest André Gellner, philosophy, logics and scientific method professor at London School of Economics, Feyerabend becomes implacable. Besides calling him arch-reactionist, states that he does not write anything correctly and makes simple reading and comprehension mistakes. To the Australian Marxist critics J. Curthoys and W. Suchting, that, for him, do not know how to read and do not understand what they read, Feyerabend purely and simply gives a class about how to develop an argumentation in a competent manner. (FEYERABEND, 2011).

These described facts characterize the literary style, canny, brave and seductively attractive of Feyerabend. His argumentation is based on a competent dialectic, becoming a terrible polemist, because he uses masterfully all the logical and rational argument classes, not only to defend himself from the critics but also to state the “irrationality” of the science and point, incredibly methodic that the science is only an alternative among other knowledge forms, that his triumph is not due to the rigor of his methodological presuppositions or to his biggest logical coherence, but for the technological development throughout the history. However, Feyerabend recognizes in his Autobiography that “Some readers had difficulties with his style. They used to read insinuations as affirmations as facts and jokes as serious comments”(Feyerabend,1996, p.153).

In his argumentation, Feyerabend tries to demonstrate that the methodological canon, throughout the occidental science history not only had served of complete reference to the theoretical-conceptual and experimental outspreads effectively verified as, in innumerable cases, had been much more an obstacle to the free yearning for new paradigmatic discoveries reached by rational and intuitive competences.

As we can notice, Feyerabend moves a critic to the epistemological validity of any methodological strategy of general character inside the system, in other words, he assumes a position of “saboteur” of canon methods and logic arguments of exposition to criticize and put in check the established canon itself.

When he wrote the preface of the Chinese edition of “Against the Method”, Feyerabend states that his “[...] main reason to write this book was humanitarian, not intellectual. I want to support people, not make the knowledge move forward” (FEYERABEND, 2007, p. 22).

Feyerabend’s thought expressed here, changes, doubtless, the emphasis of his speech. Turns to the sense that the science has a role to play to the improvement of people’s lives’ level and the society in general. Some years before, Feyerabend had already stated these principles in his work “Erkenntnis für freie Menschen” (Knowledge for free people), 1980. Yet in the year of his death, in 1994, when he wrote his Autobiography (Feyerabend, 1996), stated categorically: “Among my reasons to write Against the Method was **to free** people from the tyranny of the philosophical obfuscators and from abstract concepts such as ‘truth’, ‘reality’ or ‘objectivity’, that narrow the vision and the behavior of people in the world” (Feyerabend, 1996, p.195, authors’ highlights).

Since the beginning of his academic career, from “Against the Method” on, Feyerabend presented with such audacity, the complexity and “disorder” of science and his methods like few philosophers and intellectuals dare to present. Besides, he never had lack of courage to face and question the establishment of the academy, always turned to the maintenance of a classic vision of the science laid on the comfortable cradle of simplicity and ordination. Against that, he points, in a transgressor and “anarchist” manner a theoretical and methodological pluralism that, doubtless, became relevant to deal with the complexity of a confuse universe in disorder, that is permanently in evolution and in the most expressively way to handle with the society’s complexity in constant mutation. Deep inside, Feyerabend convoke us to accept many theoretical canons and practice the exercise of creativity and tolerance.

Consequently, it is understood that the role of the researcher in the Administration area, as well as in the general social sciences, is such complex in the knowledge construction that he cannot, simply, be a slave for the traditional rules and dominant canons. It is necessary that he uses his imagination, creativity, discursive competence and even sagacity in order to always produce the “strong argument” that is born from the theoretical and methodological connections and interconnections.

The main objective of this essay was to bring into discussion a science philosopher that has a lot to say to everyone that is worried about the scientific work for the human beings’ freedom and emancipation. With all the contradictions and changes in his thought, Feyerabend instigates us to the reflection for his argumentative competence, sometimes, with ironical exaggerations, but always with an elevated good humor.

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